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and our evidence suggests that domestic wages and salaries are slightly 
less mobile than incomes in some other developed countries.  This 
mobility is investigated in greater detail and it is found that much of the 
intertemporal variation occurs in the middle and lower end of the income 
distribution. Lastly we recognize that the mobility of an individual’s 
income may be used as a measure of economic insecurity and we present 
measures of permanent income inequality that account for this 
phenomenon. We find that permanent income inequality increases 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Most research on the inequality of income is of the cross sectional variety, measuring the 
dispersion of incomes at a certain point in time.  Although this approach is simple and 
appealing, a limitation is that incomes are rarely constant over a long time span and 
therefore the income of an individual at a single moment (or over a brief period) may be a 
poor reflection of his or her long run welfare. As a result, any inequality measurement 
taken at a single point will capture differences due to permanent, structural inequalities in 
incomes which will persist over time, and differences due to transitory fluctuations which 
will not. This issue is problematic for the interpretation of cross sectional inequality 
estimates as the welfare effects of permanent income inequality are very different from 
the welfare effects of fluctuations. 
 
A solution to this problem is to employ longitudinal data sets to obtain inequality 
measurements that consider intertemporal income dynamics as well as cross sectional 
inequalities.  One simple method is to obtain ‘permanent’ (long-run average) incomes for 
each individual. As they are calculated over a long time span, these incomes provide a 
good reflection of the economic welfare of each person and the inequality between these 
incomes gives a picture of the time-persistent or ingrained inequality within the economy. 
Several prominent studies that address this issue include the works of Burkhauser and 
Poupore (1997), Blundell and Preston (1998) and Gangl (2004) which quantify and 
compare permanent income inequality in the U.S. and various European countries. 
 
A second method for including the effects of income dynamics into studies of inequality 
is to address the issue of income mobility.  Consider a panel of data where substantial 
cross sectional inequality exists, and all incomes are perfectly immobile over the time 
period (i.e. each individual may earn a different income, but the incomes do not change).  
In this instance there will be no difference between short term static incomes and long 
run permanent incomes and all inequality measured is of the ingrained, permanent variety.  
Alternatively a case may exist where identical cross sectional inequality exists at a 
particular time period, but the incomes are highly mobile such that persons earning a low 
income in one time period may earn a high income at some subsequent point in time.  In 
this instance there is likely to be a significant difference between static and permanent 
income inequality measurements due to the averaging out of transitory fluctuations over 
time.  If this averaging process eventually equalizes all incomes, then permanent 
inequality is non-existent and all cross sectional inequality is of the transitory type.   
 
In reality most income distributions are a combination of these two pictures, where a 
certain proportion of cross sectional inequality reflects permanent structural differences 
in earnings, while the remainder is the result of short term fluctuations. As the breakdown 
of cross sectional inequality into permanent and transitory components depends upon the 
mobility of incomes, we can incorporate income dynamics into inequality measurement 
by augmenting static or cross-sectional measurements with estimates of the mobility of 
incomes.  Studies taking this approach include the work of Aaberge et al. (2002) which 
showed a similarity in income mobility between the United States and Scandinavian 
countries and other prominent works by Chen (2009), Jarvis and Jenkins (2001) and   3
Canto (2000) which presented estimates of income mobility in Britain and Spain 
respectively. Recent research of this kind on Australian data includes work on inter-
generational income mobility by Leigh (2007) and a study of mobility and the financial 
disadvantage of children by Harding (2006).  Other prominent papers include the works 
of Barrett et al. (2000), Breusch and Mitchell (2003) and Headey et al.’s (2005) analysis 
of poverty and mobility. 
 
In this paper we seek to add to the aforementioned literature by exploring the links 
between income inequality and mobility using Australian data. Using a set of established 
techniques we measure mobility and inequality and study the interaction between these 
concepts.  We also use some more progressive methods to examine the mobility of 
incomes in finer detail. This may be motivated by noting that intertemporal variation at 
the lower end of the income distribution has a different impact upon welfare than 
mobility at the higher end; and hence a need exists to distinguish between these cases.  
The differing impacts arise as low end mobility describes the movements of individuals 
in and out of the lowest earning income groups, while high end mobility describes the 
movements of persons between the mid level and higher income groups.  As a result of 
these movements low end mobility tends to compress the long run average incomes of 
low and middle income earners, while high end mobility reduces permanent income 
inequality at the middle and higher end. 
 
The idea that mobility varies over the distribution to further effect by using it to study 
economic insecurity. Like Jarvis and Jenkins (2001) and Hacker (2004) we acknowledge 
that while income mobility has a ‘good’ aspect in that it tends to reduce structural 
inequality, it also has a ‘bad’ aspect in that it may be seen as an undesirable source of 
anxiety. This issue is addressed by following authors such as Allanson (2008) by 
factoring in disutility from income volatility into our study. This is done by employing a 
concave, monotonic utility function to determine a risk free income level for each 
individual that yields the same utility as each original income stream. By calculating the 
inequality between these ‘risk adjusted’ incomes we can determine the effect of economic 
insecurity upon long run inequality. As we are able to determine a mobility based ‘risk 
premium’ for each individual this method also provides some further innovative 
techniques for investigating the location of mobility over the distribution of income more 
thoroughly.  
 
The paper is organized as follows:  In Section 2 the data set is introduced and the 
processes of organizing and preconditioning the data are described. In Section 3 we begin 
by comparing cross sectional inequality estimates with measurements based on 
permanent incomes to show that there is dynamic mobility within our dataset. This 
mobility is measured using several methods in Section 4 and some cross national 
comparisons are provided to place the estimates for Australia in context.  In Section 5 our 
focus turns to investigating where the mobility in Australian incomes occur across the 
distribution. Section 6 builds on this concept by presenting measurements of inequality 
adjusted for the economic insecurity due to income volatility and presents some further 
evidence on the location of Australian income mobility. 
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II.  DATA 
 
Our data comes from the first six waves of the Australian HILDA data panel which 
presents the results of a series of annual surveys starting in 2001. Though a number of 
income related variables are available we use the imputed series _WSCEI throughout the 
paper.  This variable contains the average weekly wage and salary incomes of over 
20,000 Australian individuals accruing from all forms of paid employment over the time 
period.   The incomes used are reported before taxation and governmental transfers take 
effect and hence the results we obtain are slightly different to those obtained in 
comparable studies (such as by Chen (2009), Jarvis and Jenkins (2001) and Canto (2000)) 
where data representing after tax and transfer incomes are used.  We use this more basic 
data series as we are interested in examining the effects of earnings volatility upon 
inequality; and as market income is more exposed to changing labour market conditions 
and other factors than net income it makes a more appropriate vehicle for our analysis. 
We anticipate that the inequality and mobility within this data set would be slightly 
higher than if net incomes were used due to the smoothing and redistributive effects of 
taxation and transfers.  
 
As estimates of income mobility are typically sensitive to persons entering and leaving 
labour markets we condition our data upon labour force participation to filter out these 
effects. This is done as the entry of persons into the labour force creates substantial 
upward mobility as their market earnings increase from zero, while persons leaving the 
labour market due to retirement, maternity etc typically see their wage/salary fall back to 
zero. As these changes are not representative of dynamic mobility within the distribution 
(rather they involve movement in and out of the sample) they are removed, allowing our 
results to reflect mobility and inequality within the continuing labour force. Thus 
employed and unemployed workers are included in the sample but persons who drop out 
of the labour force are omitted for the period of their absence.  Furthermore, as we are 
interested in dynamic changes in income we require that each individual reports 
participation in the labour force for at least two of the six surveyed years such that a basis 
for intertemporal comparison exists.  Such a restriction is rather undemanding however 
and we note that the majority of participants’ record incomes for either five or six of the 
six time periods, and that omitting these observations still leaves a final sample of 9000 
individuals. Lastly we removed the effects of inflation and economic growth from our 
data as these factors, even if they occurred in a uniform fashion, would influence our 
estimates of income volatility. This was done by scaling the incomes from each wave 
such that the mean income levels were equivalised at the 2002 level and the 
transformation does not affect the estimation of inequality or mobility statistics. 
 
 
III.  CROSS SECTIONAL AND PERMANENT INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
Suppose we have the set of n  incomes  across  k time periods  } 0 : { ≥ ℜ∧ ∈ = it x x X  
where  it x  is the income of individual i in time period t.  There are a large number of 
inequality indices that may be used to measure the dispersion of incomes at cross section 
t.  Here we select two practical measures, the Gini coefficient and half the square of the   5
Coefficient of Variation to estimate the inequality at each cross section. The Gini 
coefficient is chosen as it satisfies important axiomatic criteria such as the transfer 
principle and is frequently employed in empirical studies on the distribution of income. 
Half the squared Coefficient of Variation is another popular axiomatically sound index 
and is a member of the Generalized Entropy (GE) class of measure (see Cowell, 1981).  
Both measures can handle distributions that contain incomes of zero and make a useful 
pairing as the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to income changes around the mean of 
the distribution while half the squared Coefficient of Variation is more sensitive at the 
extremities.  
 
The Gini coefficient at cross section t is 
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where μ  is the mean income level as equalized across all time periods.  Similarly half 
the square of the Coefficient of Variation is given as 
 






















=                (2) 
 
Calculating inequality between  n x x ... 1  at  k t ... 1 =   (from 2002-2007) using these 
measures gives the figures in the following table. 
 
 




1 CV  
2001 0.415295  0.357434 
2002 0.409930  0.348875 
2003 0.408777  0.341132 
2004 0.408014  0.352275 
2005 0.405966  0.352989 
2006 0.397624  0.311870 
 
 
The figures in Table 1 show a slight but steady decline in cross sectional inequality over 
the time period, however as we have noted these static estimates do not provide a full 
picture of Australian inequality if there is a degree of income mobility within our 
distribution.  To counter this problem we use permanent incomes averaged across 
multiple time periods in place of simple cross sectional observations. Though our data do 
not extend sufficiently into the past to determine true permanent incomes of each 
individual we may generate an estimate of each person’s long run income simply by   6
averaging yearly incomes over time. If individual iearns the incomes  ik i i x x x ... , , 2 1  over k 
time periods then we define the estimate of the permanent income of person i as 
 














i x  is an estimate of the permanent income of individual i. The inequality between 
the permanent incomes 
* x   is calculatable using standard inequality indices and is 
measured at  ( ) 3678 . 0
* = x G   for the Gini coefficient and ( ) 2765 . 0
* 2
2
1 = x CV for half the 
squared Coefficient of Variation. As these indices are substantially lower than the static 
inequality estimates provided in Table 1, we note that a degree of income mobility within 
our distribution is implied from the partial convergence of long run incomes. This 
mobility is investigated in further detail in the next few sections using a variety of 
techniques to provide a detailed representation of income dynamics and inequality. 
 
IV.   MEASURES OF INCOME MOBILITY 
 
A formal treatment of intra-distributional income mobility can be provided using the 
inequality based R measure from Shorrocks (1978, 1981).  The R index measures the 
extent to which permanent incomes are equalized as the time period over which they are 
measured increases.  Calculated as the ratio of long run inequality to a weighed average 
of static measures over some time period, the index has a simple interpretation as the 
proportion of cross sectional inequality that persists over an extending accounting period. 
The index lies between zero and one, where higher values indicate greater levels of 
rigidity of incomes through time. This concept is well illustrated by recalling the two 
examples of mobility and immobility given in the introduction. In both instances we 
considered cases where substantial cross sectional inequalities existed, however in the 
first scenario the incomes were immobile while in the second, all short term inequality 
was the result of transitory fluctuations which were eventually averaged out over time.   
Applying Shorrocks’ R to these distributions would yield a persistent value of one for the 
first instance as there is no scope for reductions in long run inequality due to mobility, 
while in the second case the Shorrocks’ R would diminish from one to zero rather quickly 
due to the offsetting effects of transitory income movements.    
 
 The R measure may be calculated using the equation   
 




t t x I w
X I
R                   (4) 
where  () X I  is the inequality of permanent incomes from  t ... 1  time periods,  t w  is the 
ratio of income in time period t to the average income level i.e.  ( ) μ μt t w =  and  ( ) t x I  is 
the inequality at cross section t. The evolution of the R index for Australia from 2003-
2007 is given below for our two inequality measures.  
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Table 2.  The Shorrocks R index for Australia from 2002-2006 
Measure  R Wave I-II  R Wave I-III  R Wave I-IV R Wave I-V  R Wave I-VI
Gini  0.986129  0.969785 0.9523 0.924266  0.899772 
½ CV
2  0.960073 0.91848 0.885935  0.832373  0.798473 
 
As evident in Table 4 and Figure 1 below, the choice of income inequality metric has a 
substantial impact on the Shorrocks R index.  Statistics calculated using the Gini 
coefficient usually give higher values for R than for other inequality measures (Jarvis and 
Jenkins, 2001) that place greater weights on the extremities of the income distribution.  
Thus for a meaningful cross national comparison to be made we need to ensure that (i) 
the same inequality measure is used across both studies and (ii) that the measure is taken 
over a time period of equal length. Estimates of R for the U.S. using the Gini coefficient 
are placed at 0.97 for a one year accounting period (Burkhauser and Poupoure, 1997) 
while Jarvis and Jenkins (2001) estimate the same figure for Britain to be 0.95. This 
figure is also estimated at 0.95 for Spanish data by Canto (2000).  Our estimate of 0.986 
(see Table 4) for Australia indicates that 98.6% of the cross sectional inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient persists over a one year period. This figure suggests a 
lower level of income mobility than for the three other countries. 
 
 




The longer term trends in R indices may be examined using Figure 1 which shows a slow 
but egalitarian trend using both measures.  For instance we note that the Gini coefficient 
declines by around 10% over a six year period, while half the squared Coefficient of 
Variation is reduced by approximately double this amount over the same length of time. 
The more substantial reduction in inequality as measured by half the squared Coefficient   8
of Variation relative to the Gini coefficient is likely to be the result of the strong 
sensitivity the measure exhibits to changes in incomes at the high end of the distribution.   
 
Comparable longer term results for R using the Gini coefficient were calculated by 
Burkhauser and Poupoure (1997) using data from the U.S. and Germany, though the data 
used represents incomes sampled in the 1980s.  Their estimates place the R statistic at 
0.787 and 0.880 respectively for these countries over a six year period.  Both estimates 
are lower than the figure of 0.899 we estimate for Australia and suggest that Australian 
income inequality is more persistent than in the US or Germany two decades ago. 
 
The results for Australia generated using the R index may be supported using other 
methods for measuring income mobility. Though somewhat ad hoc in nature the mobility 
estimates provided here are commonly calculated and are thus useful for cross national 
comparisons. These income mobility statistics work by measuring the degree of change 
as distribution  ( ) 1 , 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 ,... , − − − − = t n t t t x x x x    is transformed to distribution 
( ) t n t t t x x x x , , 2 , 1 ,... , =  over accounting period  ) 1 ( − − t t .  If each  it it x x = −1  then there is 
said to be perfect income immobility or rigidity over the time period  t t → −1 , while  an 
income mobility measure will take on non-zero values when a degree of difference 
between  1 − t x  and  t x  occurs.  As with the R index, the length of the accounting period 
will affect the measure of mobility as a short time period gives little opportunity for 
incomes to deviate.  A commonly used measure of income mobility between two points 
in time is Hart’s (1978) index, which can be calculated as 
 
      ( ) t t x x H ln , ln 1 1 − − = ρ               (5) 
 
where ρ  is the Pearson correlation coefficient.  A simple measure of immobility that is 
frequently quoted alongside Hart’s index is the correlation between 1 − t x    and t x . We 
present Hart’s measure and the correlation coefficient for the mobility of incomes 
between our time periods in the table below. 
 
 
Table 3. Australian income immobility and mobility indices  
Waves Correlation  (ρ) Hart’s  index 
I-II 0.776364  0.192097 
II-III 0.753326  0.184030 
III-IV 0.771555  0.139528 
IV-V 0.746114  0.146935 
V-VI 0.759795  0.171575 
 
 
The results may be compared to similar estimates provided by the Jarvis and Jenkins 
study of British mobility and Canto’s equivalent study on Spain.  Correlations between 
yearly income data for Britain lie between 0.56 and 0.69 while estimates for Spanish data 
are 0.705 and 0.867, depending on the sampling technique used. Estimates of Hart’s   9
measure for Spain are 0.225 and 0.096 under alternative assumptions. The results are 
consistent with our initial finding that Australian incomes are less mobile than their 
British counterparts; and are perhaps more similar to those described by Spanish data, 
despite the use of market income rather than net income for the Australian estimates.  
Combining these findings with those derived using the Shorrocks index encourages us to 
conclude that the transitory component of Australian inequality is relatively low 
compared to several other developed countries. 
 
 
V.  MOBILITY OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
 
 
Although the mobility indices estimated in the previous section provide a representation 
of intertemporal income movements over the entire distribution, they are silent on where 
this mobility occurs. For instance it is important to distinguish between distributions 
where volatility is concentrated at the lower, middle or higher end of the income scale.  
Mobility solely at the lower end of the income distribution enables lower income earners 
to increase their long run welfare by progressing upwards, but provides little chance for a 
low income earner to reach the top end in the future. Conversely mobility at the top of the 
distribution implies that the chances of an individual progressing to the top of the income 
distribution are quite good; providing they did not start at the lower end of the income 
scale where earnings are rigid.  
 
In this section we characterize Australian income mobility in this manner using several 
more mobility measures. A simple technique for roughly locating intertemporal mobility 
is to give the correlation coefficient and Hart’s index for the lower and upper 50% of the 
distribution where incomes are ranked according to
* x .  The correlation coefficient for 
incomes between waves is noticeably higher for the upper 50% of the income distribution 
(denoted U in the table) than the lower 50% (denoted L).  This figure varies between 
around 0.3 and 0.5 at the lower end, and 0.6-0.7 at the higher end of the distribution, 
indicating a greater level of dynamic stability for higher income earners, though the 
finding is not supported by estimates of Hart’s index where the use of logarithms 
suppresses correlation at the upper end of the distribution but increases correlation at the 
lower end. 
 
Table 4. Correlation coefficient and Hart’s index for lower and upper 50% 
Waves Correlation  (ρ) L Correlation  (ρ) U Hart’s  index  L Hart’s  index  U 
I-II 0.499560  0.703468  0.336053  0.353176 
II-III 0.330104  0.678576  0.328900  0.356565 
III-IV 0.398698  0.700592  0.304025  0.236946 
IV-V 0.407170  0.663191  0.281056  0.266082 
V-VI 0.526415  0.665210  0.292227  0.308963 
 
Though the truncated correlation coefficients and estimates of Hart’s index provide a 
guide to the location of the bulk of mobility within the distribution, the trend can be 
explored in further detail by using the transition matrix given below. The matrix is   10
constructed by defining five pentile groups; each of which consists of 20% of the total 
population where incomes are ordered from the lowest to the highest such that pentile I 
contains the lowest earning 20% and pentile V has the highest earning 20%.  This is done 
for two time periods of three years in length, P1 and P2 (P1 is from 2001-2003, P2 from 
2004-2006) where membership to a particular pentile is based on the average income of 
each individual over each three year period.  In instances where several individuals 
earned the same average income and spanned a population cutoff they were assigned to 
pentile groups proportionately, though alternative groupings of these individuals exist 
that are as feasible as the allocation used.  This is not expected to have a significant effect 
on the interpretation of the table however as such instances were small and infrequent. 
 
As per the description, the matrix shows the flow of individuals between pentiles from 
time period P1 to time period P2 and hence provides a detailed picture of mobility within 
the distribution.  An examination of the first row reveals that 56.75% of persons in the 
lowest income group during P1 were also in the lowest pentile for P2, while 27% of these 
low income earners had progressed to pentile II over this period.  Remarkably only 1.6% 
of persons in the lowest income group from 2001-2003 found themselves in the highest 
income group in 2004-2006.  
 
 
Table 5. Transition matrix for Australian income pentiles from 2001-2003 to 2004-2006 
P1/P2 I    II  III  IV  V 
I   56.75%  27.07%  9.76%  4.81%  1.60% 
II   25.94%  42.85%  21.19%  8.09%  2.21% 
III    10.03% 21.79% 43.38% 20.05%  4.88% 
IV   5.08%  5.75%  20.25%  51.00%  18.05% 
V   2.74%  2.87%  5.08%  16.18%  73.06% 
 
 
A notable feature of this table is the stability of the highest earning income group. 
Around 73% of persons in this pentile remained present after three years, which is the 
highest of all five income groups.  The next most stable group is the lowest 20% while 
the most unstable is group the second lowest 20%.  Together these results paint a picture 
of the Australian income distribution where the incomes of both low and high end earners 
are persistent while there is a reasonable degree of volatility in the middle and lower 
middle of the income distribution.  
 
Two further interesting properties of the matrix include the heavily diagonal nature and 
the remarkable level of symmetry on the off-diagonal elements. The large values down 
the main diagonal reveal that in all cases the pentile an individual occupied in P1 is the 
best predictor of his or her income group in P2, and that this trend is especially strong at 
the extremities of the distribution. The symmetry over the off diagonal elements indicates 
that movements from one pentile to another are largely offset by movements in the 
opposite direction.  For example, 9.76% of persons in pentile I moved into pentile III 
over the time period, while 10.03% of persons moved from pentile III down to pentile I.   
   11
 
VI.  MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC INSECURITY 
 
Throughout this article it has been somewhat implicit that income mobility is regarded as 
an attractive characteristic for a distribution of income to exhibit. This notion is usually 
tied in with worthy ideals of fairness and equal opportunity, however a flip side to these 
desirable characteristics is that for the individual, income mobility may represent 
economic insecurity (Hacker, 2006; Jarvis and Jenkins, 2001). A mobile income stream 
may be considered undesirable due to risk associated with income uncertainty (e.g. a 
volatile income may be perceived as more risky than a stable income, especially if the 
fluctuations are unanticipated) or a tendency for persons earning volatile incomes to over-
consume in some periods and under-consume in others.  
 
As the rationale for using permanent incomes over static measurements is that the 
permanent measure more accurately captures the welfare of the individual, it seems 
sensible to also consider the welfare effect of a volatile or unstable income. In this section 
we seek to include this factor in our analysis by modeling economic insecurity as an 
increasing function of the mobility of each individual. The approach we use has two 
advantages; firstly it allows us to standardize for economic insecurity across individuals 
such that a more complete measurement of inequality may be achieved, and secondly, as 
the economic insecurity estimated for each person gives a measurement of the mobility of 
that individual’s income, the methodology employed gives a novel method for 
understanding the nature of mobility across the distribution. 
 
Suppose individual i’s income stream  ik i i x x x ... , , 2 1   is fairly volatile over the 
period k t ... 1 = . If there are insufficient mechanisms in place to smooth the incomes 
stream through time, it is likely that this individual may prefer to accept some slightly 
lower average income if the new income level could be fixed without fluctuations. As 
this implies that volatile long run incomes are less desirable than steady incomes, we 
proceed by adjusting estimates of the permanent income of each individual to account for 
this disutility.  
 
To capture this aversion to volatility we use the following utility function   
 








x U    1 0 < ≤γ             (6) 
 
where γ  is a measure of risk. Choosing a value of zero forγ  implies no aversion towards 
income volatility for the individual such that he or she would be indifferent between any 
two income streams of the same average monetary amount, while positive values for γ  
introduce an element of concavity to the utility function and a corresponding degree of 
aversion to income volatility. Once a choice forγ  has been made, an immobile, ‘risk 
free’ income level for each individual that yields the same utility as income 
stream ik i i x x x ... , , 2 1   may be determined.  This income represents an alternative to the 
original income stream and is fixed throughout time such that an individual earning this   12
income level is free of the economic insecurity from income volatility. This income level 
may be calculated as 

































i x  is the ‘risk free’ or Equally Distributed Equivalent (EDE) income (Atkinson, 
1970) that provides the same utility as the original income stream. The EDE income will 




i x x =  if  ij i i x x x ... 2 1 = = ).  If there is a degree of volatility through time however 




i x x < ), 
reflecting the reduction utility due to the risky nature of the income stream.  
 
 
From the EDE income we also define a ‘risk premium’ for individual i as 
EDE
i i i x x r − =
* .  
This provides a measure of the burden of the risk borne by the individual in dollar terms 
and may be interpreted as the maximum amount the person is willing to pay per year to 
make his or her income stable over time period  k t ... 1 = .  The greater the risk premium  i r , 
the greater the mobility of the income stream  ik i i x x x ... , , 2 1 and the greater the economic 
insecurity faced by the individual. Thus the variable  i r  serves a dual purpose for us as it 
allows us to identify both mobility and economic insecurity within our distribution. 
 
By subtracting this value from each individual’s permanent incomes (working with 
EDE
i x )  
we standardize for economic insecurity across agents for the basis of making inequality 
comparisons. The Gini coefficient for inequality between the EDE incomes becomes 
 
 


















γ               (8) 
 
where 
EDE μ  is the mean EDE income level, while half the square of the Coefficient of 
Variation is given as 
 
























=                         (9) 
 
 
The estimates of inequality between the EDE incomes are a function of the data and the 
risk aversion parameterγ . For a given positive value of γ, how  () G γ  differs from G (and 
similar for 
2 1
2 () CV γ  and 
2
2
1 CV ) depends on the distribution of  i r  relative to that of 
*
i x .   13
If  i r  maintains a stable ratio to 
*
i x  throughout the whole income distribution, then  ( ) G γ  
will be quantitatively comparable to G. If  i r  is negatively related to 
*
i x , i.e. lower income 
earners bear a bigger income risk in proportional terms than the rich, then  () G γ  will be 
greater than G, and the gap between the two measures will enlarge as the value of γ 
increases. The opposite is true if the rich bears bigger income risk than the poor. The 
findings are given in Table 6. 
 
 




0   0.367814  0.276534 
0.1 0.370714  0.279923 
0.2 0.374221  0.284174 
0.3 0.378548  0.289601 
0.4 0.384028  0.296686 
0.5 0.391193  0.306204 
0.6 0.400915  0.319464 
0.7 0.414688  0.338796 
0.8 0.435147  0.368448 
0.9 0.464995  0.413406 
 
 
The first entries where  0 = γ  is associated with the set of incomes where 
* x x
EDE
i =  and 
hence the estimates are equal to the measurements of permanent income inequality given 
in Section 3.  For higher values of γ   the results show an unambiguous increasing 
relationship between risk aversion and permanent income inequality for both sets of 
indices, indicating that lower income earners bear a proportionally higher share of 
mobility risk than higher income earners. 
 
Again this result is consistent with our previous assertion that much of Australian income 
mobility lies at the lower end of the distribution and we may use the concept of the risk 
premium to examine this in further detail.  The two graphs given below are particularly 
illustrative for this purpose. The first is a scatter diagram of each individual’s risk 
premium (where 3 . 0 = γ ) as a proportion of total permanent income, plotted against risk 
neutral income. Though couched in terms of the risk premia, the values on the y axis are 
proportional to ( )
* * / i
EDE
i i x x x −  which is an expression for Atkinson’s (1970) inequality 
metric for the measurement of intertemporal inequality for individual i, while the x axis 
gives permanent income inequality 
*
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Figure 2. Proportionate risk premia against risk neutral permanent income 
 
 
Two features of Figure 2 stand out in particular.  The first is the distinctly higher welfare 
loss due to inequality for lower income earners than higher income earners and the 
finding is in keeping with our observation that mobility is greater at the lower end of the 
income distribution.  The second feature worth commenting on is the existence of rather 
curious ‘bands’ of observations concentrated at certain levels of proportional risk premia.  
This phenomenon indicates that income volatilities tend to congregate quite strongly 
around certain levels, and the pattern persists for different choices of γ. While a clear 
explanation of this trend defies explanation from the authors, homogeneity of volatility 
within certain industries could be a possible cause. 
 
The distribution of the risk premia may be further examined using Figure 3, which is a 
concentration curve for the risk premium as plotted against permanent income where the 
curve is constructed from incomes ordered from lowest to highest. The variable on the x-
axis, p, is generated by expressing the cumulative total of permanent incomes accruing to 
the lowest earning p percentage as a proportion of total cumulative permanent income. 
The variable on the y-axis, q, gives the cumulative proportion of risk premia constructed. 
Again, 3 . 0 = γ  is used in the figure though other choices for γ  produce near identical 
results. The variables p and q are hence calculated as 
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Figure 3. The concentration of income risk premia in Australia 2002-2007 
 
 
We can observe the distribution of risk premia by comparing the plotted curve to the 45º 
line. If the risk premium increases proportionally with permanent income across the 
income distribution, the concentration curve will be close to the diagonal line, with the 
only perturbations being the result of random noise. Instead we note a substantial positive 
bias in risk premia for lower income earners. The lowest 10% earners bear over 30% of 
total volatility risk within this distribution and the lowest 20% earners account for 46% of 
the lost utility due to income uncertainty. This is also reflected in the fact that the slope of 
the concentration curve turns from over 45% to below 45% at around p = 0.2. 
Furthermore it may be observed that the concentration curve lies above the 45º line for 
the entire distribution, indicating that at no point does the lowest earning p% of the 
population bear less than the proportional p% of the economic burden of income 
insecurity.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 suggest that mobility risk is highest at the very bottom end of the 
distribution, which is not instantly reconcilable with the results from Table 5 which 
shows that the lowest pentile is the second most stable income group.  We note however, 
that Table 5 gives the flows of persons between pentiles and does not consider the 
mobility of incomes within pentile groups.  Therefore, the results from these differing 
approaches are consistent if there is significant mobility within pentile I but that much of 
the mobility is insufficient to push persons into higher income groups.   16
 
The central implication of the results from the transition matrix and the risk premia is that 
if we do view income volatility as a suitable measure for income insecurity we see that 
lower income earners face further disadvantages than diminished earnings would suggest. 
As studies on permanent income inequality are primarily concerned with the welfare of 
the constitute individuals the inclusion of this effect appears to be a reasonable 
development. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper analyzes recent data on Australian income inequality, mobility and insecurity. 
Our results suggest that overall Australian income mobility is lower than figures reported 
for several developed countries including Britain, the U.S. and Germany. Certain caveats 
concerning differences in variables analyzed and the differing windows in time over 
which the results are drawn do however apply. Using a variety of techniques we study 
Australian income mobility in greater detail and show that much of the mobility occurs at 
the middle and lower end of the distribution while high incomes tend to be relatively 
stable through time. The results collectively suggest that most of the income mobility in 
Australia could be the result of income churning amongst persons in the middle and 
lower income brackets There are three main conclusions that may be drawn from these 
findings: (i) volatility for lower incomes suggests ingrained poverty is lower than a 
standard cross sectional study would suggest, (ii) lower income earners face greater 
levels of economic insecurity than higher income earners, and (iii) few low income 
earners appeared to progress to the higher end of the distribution. We also find that by 
adjusting an individual’s income stream to account for economic insecurity reveals a 
higher level of inequality as the burden of this volatility lies disproportionately upon 
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